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Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 
Ratcheting Down the Doctrine of Equivalents 
Unfortunately, the nature of language makes it impossible to capture 
the essence of a thing in a patent application. The inventor who chooses 
to patent an invention and disclose it to the public, rather than exploit it 
in secret, bears the risk that others will devote their efforts toward 
exploiting the limits of the patent’s language: “An invention exists 
most importantly as a tangible structure or a series of drawings. A 
verbal portrayal is usually an afterthought written to satisfy the 
requirements of patent law. This conversion of machine to words 
allows for unintended idea gaps which cannot be satisfactorily filled.”1 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Festo was yet another in a line of cases 
that limit the application of the doctrine of equivalents. The opinion 
added a further limitation on the doctrine of equivalents effectively now 
requiring that the equivalent not be foreseeable. This new element will 
add more expense to litigation by requiring expert testimony not only 
about the state of the art and the scope of the claims involved in the case, 
but also as to what would have been foreseeable at the time of the 
application for the patent. Such standards, rather than fostering invention, 
make it increasingly difficult for parties to enforce their patents. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Society has long recognized the importance of fostering creativity in 
order to advance and benefit society. To this end, the government grants 
limited monopolies in the form of intellectual property rights. In the 
government’s grant of these monopolies, a tension is created between 
encouraging subsequent parties to take what is known and improve upon 
it (thereby further benefiting society) and encouraging parties to invest 
the initial efforts to benefit society. A particularly difficult issue arises 
when government encourages others who come later to make further 
advances, especially in the patent system. At one extreme, a subsequent 
party could exploit the initial creative effort by making minor or 
insubstantial changes to some form of intellectual property and thus 
avoid infringement. Such a policy would have a chilling effect on parties 
 
 1. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002) (citing 
Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 384 F.2d 391 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
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contemplating making the original investment in development. 
Consequently, out of a feeling of fundamental fairness, courts have 
developed a nebulous range of equivalents for just such situations.2 With 
respect to patents, this practice has long been recognized and is known as 
the “doctrine of equivalents.”3 
This range of equivalents covers that which is similar enough to the 
intellectual property in question that it would infringe upon the property 
holder’s rights. At the same time, however, the equivalent is not exactly 
what the intellectual property holder owns. The range becomes hazy  
because it is difficult to draw a bright line between that which is not 
exactly the same as the intellectual property at issue, but may be similar 
enough to infringe, and that which is dissimilar enough not to infringe.4 
To allow cheap knock-offs would discourage originality. 
However, this range of equivalents may also have a chilling effect. 
Consider the case of a subsequent inventor who has conceived of an 
improved product or method that is somewhat similar to a previous 
invention. Such a situation is commonplace in today’s crowded 
marketplace. Before undertaking this new development, the second-
comer would likely look at the patents held by his competitors. The 
range of equivalents makes it unclear what he can make without 
infringing the other party’s intellectual property rights. In the patent 
field, the range of equivalents is limited by changes or amendments that 
the inventor makes to his patent application and is commonly known as 
prosecution history estoppel.5 
Consequently, there is a conflict between the public notice function 
of claims and the prosecution history and fairness. This conflict arises 
due to the nature of language. Regardless of how carefully a patent 
drafter chooses his words, his words are still inexact. To strictly hold a 
patentee to the language of the claims necessarily prevents the patentee 
from obtaining the full benefit of his discovery. Alternatively, to allow a 
patentee to recapture any or all of the claim scope that he gave up in 
order to secure the patent would unfairly prevent subsequent inventors 
from being able to develop an idea due to the uncertainty that he would 
not be sued for patent infringement. 
It is unclear when the doctrine of equivalents emerged, but it seems 
to be as old as the patent system itself. 6 As the manner in which 
 
 2. See Graver Tank v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950). 
 3. See Winans v. Adam, 56 U.S. 330, 341-343 (1853). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211, 220-21 (1940). 
 6. See generally Winans v. Adam, 56 U.S. 300, 341-43 (1853) (citing several cases wherein 
the courts applied the doctrine of equivalents as then understood). 
FISHER - MACRO FINAL 4/30/2003  5:19 PM 
345] DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS 347 
patentees stake out the metes and bounds of their patents has evolved, the 
doctrine of equivalents has evolved as well. Despite the evolution of the 
doctrine of equivalents, the doctrine remains a murky area of patent law. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Festo, though adding few clear 
standards, took a step toward holding patentees to a narrower 
interpretation of their claims. 
This comment discusses the general historical progression of 
intellectual property in order to compare and contrast the rights at stake 
and the similarities in each of the different areas. Next, this comment 
includes a brief example of the purpose of the doctrine of equivalents. 
Then it outlines the evolution of the U.S. patent system as reflected by 
the evolution of the patent statute. This comment also discusses the 
historical progression of the doctrine of equivalents and its role in the 
constantly evolving field of patent law. Finally, it analyzes the impact 
that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Festo will likely have on 
patent practice. 
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 
In the most general sense, the three types of intellectual property 
protected in the United States are patents, copyrights, and trademarks. 
An understanding of each of these types of intellectual property, and how 
they work, is useful in understanding the purpose of the patent regime 
and how those purposes are carried out. 
Each type of intellectual property has a different standard in terms of 
how protection is obtained, the rights of the property holder, the duration 
of the protection, and how a third party infringes on an intellectual 
property holder’s rights. In addition to different standards, each type of 
intellectual property protection has a vague zone of equivalents. 
A. Copyrights 
Copyright protection is the easiest of the three types of intellectual 
property protection to obtain. The statute for copyright protection merely 
requires that works be “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they 
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly 
or with the aid of a machine or device.”7 The Supreme Court, in Feist 
Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co., interpreted this standard to 
merely require that the work contain “a modicum of creativity.”8 In 
 
 7. 17 U.S.C.S. § 102(a) (2002). 
 8. 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding that although an arrangement of facts may be the proper 
subject of copyright protection, placing names in a phone book in alphabetical order is not). 
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reaching its decision the Supreme Court clarified that facts are not 
copyrightable, but compilations of facts may be if they demonstrate the 
“modicum of creativity” discussed above.9 In light of this low threshold, 
Congress has placed limits on the proper subject matter for copyrights. 
This statutory exclusion states, “In no case does copyright protection for 
an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, 
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless 
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied 
in such work.”10 Thus, copyright protection does not give an author the 
right to protect an idea. However, an author of a copyrighted work can 
preclude others from reproducing the work, making derivative works, 
distributing copies of the work by sale, and performing or displaying the 
copyrighted work publicly.11 
For works created after 1978,12 this protection lasts for the life of the 
author plus 70 years for an individual, or for the lesser of 95 years from 
publication or 120 years from creation in the case of other entities.13 
During this time, a copyright holder can preclude others from doing the 
activities listed above. Obviously, if a third party were to use a direct 
copy in any of the activities listed above, he would directly infringe upon 
the copyright holder’s rights. However, copyright protection extends to 
more than just direct infringement. To understand how far this protection 
extends, it is necessary to understand what constitutes direct 
infringement. 
According Arnstein v. Porter,14 infringement requires both copying 
and improper appropriation. Copying is proved either by direct evidence 
of copying (which is generally not available) or by a combination of 
proof of access and substantial similarity.15 Improper appropriation is 
proved by showing that  “[the] defendant from the plaintiff’s works took 
so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners . . . that the 
defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the 
plaintiff.”16 
Accordingly, there is a tenuous zone of equivalents in which a 
copyright holder has rights. The court’s opinion in Arnstein shows that 
this zone of equivalents is based on fairness; it aims to keep others from 
 
 9. Id. at 362. 
 10. 17 U.S.C.S. § 102(b) (2002). 
 11. 17 U.S.C.S. § 106 (2002). 
 12. 17 U.S.C.S. §101 (2002), for works created before 1978, there is a different standard in 
terms of length and eligible subject matter. 
 13. 17 U.S.C.S. § 301-305 (2002). 
 14. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 15. Id. at 469. 
 16. Id. at 473. 
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stealing the heart of what is copyrighted, even though the copying may 
not be direct. An example might be changing the characters’ names in a 
book but otherwise leaving the rest of the book unchanged. The range 
becomes nebulous as more elements are changed in a story. This 
nebulous range raises a difficult question: at what point, we must ask, 
does the copyright attempt to protect the idea, rather than the expression? 
B. Trademarks 
Similar fairness concerns are found in trademark law. A trademark is 
“any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof (1) used 
by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in 
commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by” 
the Trademark Act.17 In the United States, there are two federal registers 
for trademarks, the principal register and the supplemental register. 
Registration on the principal register, the more valuable of the two, 
entitles the trademark owner to several valuable rights. These rights 
include constructive notice to the public of the owner’s claim of 
ownership of the mark, a legal presumption of the registrant’s ownership 
of the mark and the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark 
nationwide on or in connection with the goods and/or services listed in 
the registration; a date of constructive use of the mark as of the filing 
date of the application; the ability to bring an action concerning the mark 
in federal court; and the fact that the registrant’s exclusive right to use a 
mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services 
covered by the registration can become “incontestable,” subject to certain 
statutory defenses.18 
In order to be eligible for registration, a trademark must identify the 
source of the goods, rather than a type or characteristic of the goods. The 
three types of trademarks are those that are descriptive, those that are 
suggestive, and those that are arbitrary.19 To literally infringe on a 
trademark owner’s rights, a third party must not only use the owner’s 
exact mark, but must also use the mark on related goods.20 
Since it is unlikely that such a situation would occur, the courts have 
laid down a test to determine whether a trademark would infringe despite 
not being exactly the same as the asserted mark: This standard asks 
whether the marks are so similar that there is a likelihood of confusion 
 
 17. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 1127 (2002). 
 18. Trademark Manual Examination Proc. 801.02(a) Third Ed. Rev. 1. 
 19. ROBERT P. MERGES, ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
AGE 580 (2d ed. 2000). Classification of trademarks within these three categories is a complicated 
area, which is the subject of much discussion. Id. at 580- 592. 
 20. See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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among relevant consumers.21 The test is multi-factored, and as with most 
multi-factored tests, the likelihood-of-confusion test is a case-specific 
inquiry. This approach introduces a nebulous zone of equivalents 
wherein a third party may infringe upon a trademark owner’s rights 
without using the same mark on related goods. Thus, one must ask: 
When is a mark dissimilar enough to be distinctive, and what goods are 
sufficiently related? 
C. Patents 
A similar nebulous zone of equivalents exists in patent law. Patents 
protect new and useful inventions.22 In order to be eligible for patent 
protection, an invention must be both novel23 and non-obvious.24 The 
requirements for novelty are discussed in 35 U.S.C. § 102. This section 
requires that nothing exactly the same as that claimed in the application 
be published before the invention date,25 that the invention not be known 
or used by others, or that it be on sale for more than one year before the 
application date.26  Section 102 also requires that the inventor has not 
abandoned, suppressed, or concealed the invention and that the inventor 
be the first inventor.27 In order for a third party to infringe upon a patent 
holder’s rights, an accused infringing device or process must contain 
each and every element of the protected device, either literally or by 
equivalents.28 
To summarize, copyrights protect original works of authorship, 
trademarks identify sources of goods, and patents protect new and useful 
inventions or discoveries. With respect to equivalents, copyright 
infringement is found when the copied work is so substantially similar 
that it takes the heart of the idea, trademark infringement is found when 
the marks are so similar that there is a likelihood of confusion, and patent 
infringement is found when the differences between the claimed element 
and the accused infringer is insubstantial. Each of these standards reflects 
the lack of bright-line standards necessary to accomplish fundamental 
fairness. This lack of definite standards for infringement makes it 
difficult for others to know what they can and cannot do. Thus, there is 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. See 35 U.S.C.S. § 101 (2002). 
 23. 35 U.S.C.S § 102 (2002). 
 24. 35 U.S.C.S. § 103(a) (2002). 
 25. 35 U.S.C.S. § 102(a). 
 26. 35 U.S.C.S. § 102(b). 
 27. 35 U.S.C.S. § 102(c)-(g). 
 28. Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 
1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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tension between the goals of fostering creativity for first-comers and of 
continuing to foster improvement for those who come later. 
III. INTRODUCTION TO THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS IN THE PATENT 
SYSTEM 
The uneasy balance sought by the doctrine of equivalents has its 
roots in the inception of the doctrine. The doctrine of equivalents is a 
judicially created remedy. The doctrine of equivalents creates a “zone” 
of equivalents beyond what is described in the literal language of a 
patent. To understand the usefulness and importance of equivalents, a 
simple example may prove useful. 
Suppose a person is in the business of making shovels. Further 
suppose that the shovel maker has spent considerable time and money in 
developing a novel shovel and has in fact obtained a patent on the shovel. 
The shovel works exceptionally well, especially the handle that excels at 
resisting torque in any direction. The shovel maker spends substantial 
time and money “prosecuting”29 his patent before the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Further suppose that his original 
claim reads: 
a shovel, comprising: 
a handle, 
first and second ends; and a 
a blade disposed on the second end of the handle. 
Further suppose that the examiner at the USPTO finds a reference that is 
several years old that shows all the elements disclosed above, and 
properly rejects the claim above, citing the earlier reference to the 
applicant. In response to the examiner’s rejection, the applicant then 
changes the claim to overcome the prior art reference, pointing out the 
differences between his shovel and the old shovel.30 A patent issues 
wherein the single claim reads: 
 
 29. Prosecution of patents generally includes preparing an application, submitting it to the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and corresponding with an examiner at the 
USPTO in an ex parte proceeding until the patent either issues or is abandoned. The examiners serve 
as gatekeepers in that they make efforts to assure that patents that issue are not found already in the 
public domain or the subject of previous patents. Part of this process typically involves the examiner 
citing prior art, which she feels precludes, or at least limits, what the applicant is entitled to in  the 
scope of any issuing patents. The applicant then responds by either trying to show why the 
examiner’s assertions are wrong and/or why the subject matter of the application is distinct from the 
reference cited by the examiner. Any changes made to the application are referred to as amendments. 
The most important amendments made to an application are made to the claims. The importance of 
the claims will be discussed further below. 
 30. Such action would bring about what is known as “prosecution history estoppel.”  
Prosecution history estoppel may arise when a patentee amends claims or makes arguments during 
prosecution. See Pharmacia & Upjohn v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 170 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In 
other words, arguments and changes to the application that are made to obtain allowance of the 
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a shovel, comprising: 
a handle, 
the handle having a circular cross-section and further comprising 
first and second ends; and a 
a blade disposed on the second end of the handle. 
Although this example is simple, it is useful in its simplicity. 
Assuming that the patent is valid and enforceable and that there would be 
an incentive for a third party to make use of the patented shovel, it is 
likely that competitors would take advantage of the useful new shovel 
design. One of the competitors might look at the claim of the 
subsequently issuing patent and decide that the patentee has amended his 
claim to specifically include a round cross section. In order to infringe 
literally, an infringing shovel would have to include at least a handle 
with at least two ends having a circular cross section, and it would also 
have to include a blade on the second end. Suppose that a competing 
shovel maker decides to make a shovel, but instead of a circular cross 
section, the competing shovel maker uses a handle using an oval cross 
section. Those with experience in designing handles that are good at 
resisting torque generally understand that an oval cross section is 
substantially the same as a circular cross section for resisting torque 
loads applied to handles. The question thus becomes whether the 
competing oval handled shovel would infringe on the claims of the 
shovel patent. 
The oval-handled shovel would clearly not literally infringe on the 
shovel patent because an oval is not a circle. Should the shovel maker be 
allowed to keep others from making, using, or selling the oval handled 
shovel on this basis?  Conversely, shouldn’t the competitor be able to 
rely on the notice function fulfilled by the claims and the prosecution 
history to design around the claims? 
Resolving this issue is complicated. On one hand, there might be a 
chilling effect on the advancement of technology if inventors had no 
assurance that third parties could make insubstantial changes to the 
patented subject matter and without infringing on the patent. Companies 
would have little or no incentive to invest money if once a patent was 
granted anyone could make minor changes and avoid infringing on the 
patent. 
 
claims give rise to prosecution history estoppel. This estoppel prevents a patentee from reclaiming 
subject matter surrendered during prosecution. Id. This subject matter is part of the record and is 
available to the public. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In 
sum, a patentee cannot say that he did not give up something he relinquished in order to obtain a 
patent. What the patentee actually relinquished during prosecution is the subject of much litigation, 
and the basis of the Festo cases that will be discussed below. 
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On the other hand, the doctrine of equivalents may have a different 
type of chilling effect. Suppose, for example, that you are in the business 
of designing shovels and want to create a shovel similar to the one 
described above except improve upon the design of its handle. Given the 
language of the patent, you may suppose that utilizing a square handle is 
sufficiently different so that you would not infringe the claim of the 
patent. The ambiguity of the doctrine makes it uncertain what is 
equivalent to a circular handle. This is especially true given the changes 
made to the claims during the prosecution of the patent. Clearly the 
patentee gave up something when he changed his claims, but how much?  
Consequently, technology may stagnate because innovators may be 
unwilling to attempt improvements. Supporting this argument is the fact 
that it is a patentee who drafts the claims. In the example above, the 
patentee could have chosen to claim an oval cross section, but instead 
claimed only the circular cross section. Although this example is simple, 
it illustrates the tension that equivalents create between seeking to 
prevent infringers from pirating an idea and fostering creativity by 
providing clarity in what is patented. A look into the history of the 
doctrine of equivalents is useful in understanding the complexity of the 
current state of affairs. 
IV. THE PATENT SYSTEM 
With the differences between the three types of intellectual property 
in mind, the doctrine of equivalents as used in the patent system will 
comprise the majority of the remainder of this comment. In particular, 
the comment addresses the effects of recent developments with respect to 
the doctrine of equivalents as it applies to prosecution history estoppel. 
In order to fully appreciate the impact of recent decisions on the doctrine 
of equivalents, it is useful to understand how the patent system has 
evolved and how the doctrine of equivalents has evolved with it. 
A. Evolution of the Patent Statute 
The sequence of Congressional legislation is useful in tracing the 
development of the patent law system in the United States. The statutes 
have evolved from requiring a general distinction over what was 
previously known31 to the current claiming regime that mandates that 
“the specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly 
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the 
applicant regards as his invention.”32 
 
 31. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, §2, 1 Stat. 109. 
 32. 35 U.S.C.S. §112 (2002). 
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The Constitution granted Congress the power “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”33 The first Congressional expression of this power was 
found in the Patent Act of 1790.34 Section 2 of the Act required that the 
specification be 
so particular, and said models so exact, as not only to distinguish the 
invention or discovery from other things before known and used, but 
also to enable a workman or other person skilled in the art or 
manufacture . . . to make, construct, or use the same, to the end that the 
public may have the full benefit thereof, after the expiration of the 
patent term.35 
Thus, the first patent act merely required that the specification 
distinguish the invention from the prior art, without a statutory 
requirement for claims. However, according to a foremost patent expert, 
Donald Chisum, while descriptions did not require the use of a claim, the 
courts interpreted this language as requiring the equivalent of claims.36 
Congress modified the act three years later, but did not substantively 
change the requirement that the inventor merely distinguish the invention 
from the prior art and enable others to make and use the invention.37 
Congress made a clear step toward requiring claims in 1836. The Act 
of 1836, like previous acts, required that an inventor 
deliver a written description of his invention or discovery, and of the 
manner and process of making, constructing, using, and compounding 
the same, in such full, clear and exact terms . . . as to enable any person 
skilled in the art or science to which it appertains . . . to make, 
construct, compound and use the same.38 
Unlike the previous acts, the Act of 1836 added an additional 
requirement that the inventor “particularly specify and point out the part, 
improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own invention or 
discovery.”39 Thus, Congress began to require not only that a patentee 
distinguish his invention over what had been previously known, but also 
apprise others of what the patentee claimed as his invention. 
 
 33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl8. 
 34. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. at 109. 
 35. Id. at 110. 
 36. 3-8 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 8.02 (2002) (citing Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of 
U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 134, 377, 457 (1938); Homer J. Schneider, Claims to Fame, 71 
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 143 (1989); William Redin Woodward, Definiteness and 
Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 MICH. L. REV. 755 (1948)). 
 37. See Act. of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318. See also CHISUM supra note 36 §  8.02. 
 38. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 119 
 39. Id. 
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In 1870, Congress added a subtle yet significant requirement. The 
1870 version of the Act requires a patentee to “particularly point out and 
distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination which he claims 
as his invention or discovery.”40 This subtle difference, rather than 
implicitly requiring an applicant to claim what he regards as invention, 
positively requires that the patentee claim the invention. 
In 1952, Congress retained the positive claim requirement, but 
altered the language slightly to include the following: “[T]he 
specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly 
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the 
applicant regards as his invention.”41 Thus, the current version of the Act 
clarifies that it is the claim that defines the patent. 
As described above, the patent statute has required more and more 
that the patentee point out what he regards as his invention. This requires 
a patent drafter to write with more and more precision. Such precision 
would be onerous without some mitigation, like the doctrine of 
equivalents. Congress has the power to draw the line, but has left it up to 
the courts to decide the issue. 
B. Historical Progression of the Doctrine of Equivalents 
1. Winans 
One of the earliest and most famous cases on the doctrine of 
equivalents is Winans v. Adam.42 In addition to being representative of 
the doctrine of equivalents as it existed early in United States history, 
Winans also provides useful insight into the infringement analysis courts 
undertook at that time. This insight into the court’s analysis is useful 
because in order to understand the doctrine of equivalents, it is also 
necessary to understand how a patent is literally infringed. 
Winans involved a patent for an improved railcar for carrying coal or 
other similar materials.43 The essence of the improvement was that the 
load was equally distributed throughout the structure, thereby vastly 
increasing the weight of coal that a railcar was able to carry.44 In the 
specification, the patentee described his invention as having “the form of 
a frustrum of a cone.”45 The accused infringing cars made by the 
 
 40. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201. 
 41. 35 U.S.C.S. § 112 (2002). 
 42. 56 U.S. 330, 1853 U.S. Lexis 288 (1853). 
 43. Id. at 330-31*1, 2. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 331. 
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defendant did not use the form of a frustrum of a cone, but rather utilized 
octagonal or pyramidal shapes.46 
The Winans Court did not address the question of literal 
infringement, but rather analyzed only whether the accused device was 
an equivalent.47 The court implied that if the accused device were exactly 
the same as the embodiment disclosed in the patent, it would clearly 
infringe. As will be discussed below, the requirements for a finding of 
literal infringement as interpreted by the courts have an important 
bearing on a determination on the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents. 
The Court articulated two questions to be answered in determining 
infringement. First, a court must determine “what is the thing 
patented.”48 Second, it must conclude whether “[the] thing [has] been 
constructed, used, or sold by the defendant.”49 In defining the specifics of 
what had been patented, the Court was in effect determining the scope of 
the patent protection. The Winans Court determined that the essence of 
the invention was “that it carried more coal in proportion to its own 
weight than any car previously in use, and that the load instead of 
distorting it, preserved it in shape, acting as a frame.”50 Thus, the Court 
focused in part on the useful result of the coal car. 
For example, the Court cited approvingly of a former case involving 
a patent directed to steamboats: 
There never were two things to the eye more different than the 
plaintiff’s invention, and what the defendant had done in contravention 
of his patent-right. The plaintiff’s invention was different in form; 
different in construction; it agreed with it in only one thing, and that 
was, by moving in the water.51 
In explaining how an alleged infringing mechanism that is dissimilar 
in nearly every way can nevertheless infringe, the court stated, “the 
moment a practical, scientific man is furnished with the idea . . . he can 
multiply without end the forms in which this principle can be made to 
operate.”52 Accordingly, the court focused on the useful results of the 
invention and on the principle the patentee used to bring about those 
results. As a result, patentees were allowed a monopoly on broad 
principles. 
 
 46. Id. at 332. 
 47. See id. at 332. 
 48. Id. at 338. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 332. 
 51. Id. at 335. 
 52. Id. at 336. 
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In this context, only an invention that was exactly the same as the 
embodiment disclosed in the patent would literally infringe. On the other 
hand, the Winans Court made clear, “[S]till the question must always be, 
whether, whatever the shape he adopts, he is not availing himself of the 
principle first suggested by the patentee.”53 This broad protection 
extended to the patent as a whole. Consequently, such protection would 
encourage others to find a different principle to achieve a different and 
perhaps better and more useful result. For better or for worse, the 
principles and useful result test contained in Winans remained the 
standard for years. 
2. Graver Tank 
The Supreme Court’s next significant pronouncement of the doctrine 
of equivalents came about with a decision in 1950. Graver Tank v. Linde 
Air Products Co.54 involved an electric welding process and the fluxes 
used in that process. The patent claimed essentially a combination of 
alkaline earth metal silicate and calcium fluoride.55 The alleged 
infringing composition was similar to the patented composition, except 
that it substituted silicates of calcium and manganese for silicates of 
calcium and magnesium.56 Manganese silicate is not an alkaline earth 
metal.57 Clearly, there could not be literal infringement because all of the 
elements of the claimed composition were not present in the accused 
composition. The question then became whether the substitution of 
manganese was substantial enough to preclude a finding of infringement 
under the doctrine of equivalents.58 
The Court relied upon expert testimony to determine whether those 
familiar with the field would have readily recognized that the substitution 
described above would make the composition effective for its intended 
purpose.59 In its opinion, the Supreme Court clearly stated the purpose of 
the doctrine of equivalents: 
[C]ourts have . . . recognized that to permit imitation of a patented 
invention which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert 
the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing. Such 
a limitation would leave room for—indeed encourage— the 
unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant and insubstantial changes 
 
 53. Id. (emphasis added). 
 54. 339 U.S. 605, 606 (1950). 
 55. Id. at 610. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 610-612. 
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and substitutions in the patent which, though adding nothing, would be 
enough to take the copied matter outside the claim, and hence outside 
the reach of law. One who seeks to pirate an invention, like one who 
seeks to pirate a copyrighted book or play, may be expected to 
introduce minor variations to conceal and shelter the piracy. Outright 
and forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of infringement. 
To prohibit no other would place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism 
and would be subordinating substance to form. It would deprive him of 
the benefit of his invention and would foster concealment rather than 
disclosure of inventions, which is one of the primary purposes of the 
patent system.  The purpose of the doctrine was well known. What the 
court added, by including an approving citation to a previous case, has 
become known as the function-way-result test: “if two devices do the 
same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially 
the same result, they are the same, even though they differ in name, 
form, or shape.”60 
The function-way-result test could have added a significant amount 
of clarity to the Winans principle test, but it failed to do so. Instead, the 
test merely added two more elements, the function and the way, to 
Winans’ limited focus on the useful result. This may be because the court 
focused on the invention or device as a whole, rather than on the claim 
elements. As the precision with which applicants were required to claim 
their respective inventions increased, it became more feasible to define a 
predictable range of equivalents pertaining to those claims without 
departing from the purpose of the doctrine. Despite the addition of the 
function and way elements to the test described in Winans, defining the 
range of equivalents remained a difficult problem. This question is more 
complicated when prosecution history estoppel, a more modern doctrine, 
is also at issue. Which policy should control?  If a patentee alters a claim 
during prosecution, is he still entitled to some range of protection of 
equivalents?  If so, what is that range of equivalents? 
C. Recent Cases on the Doctrine of Equivalents 
The Federal Circuit found itself straddling two divergent lines of 
authority. One line of authority, commonly known as the Hughes I line 
applied a flexible bar with respect to prosecution history estoppel and the 
doctrine of equivalents.61 Hughes involved a patentee who had developed 
a novel system and method for controlling the attitude of satellites.62 
During the process of obtaining the patent, the patentee made changes to 
 
 60. Id. at 608 (citing Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877)). 
 61. Hughes Aircraft v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 62. Id. 
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his application to avoid the prior art.63 The accused infringer argued that 
the changes should preclude the patentee from any range of equivalents, 
based on prosecution history estoppel.64 The court refused to cut off 
equivalents completely, and instead chose to apply a flexible bar with 
respect to what the patentee surrendered during prosecution.65 The range 
of equivalents, under the flexible bar approach, depended on the purpose 
of the amendment.66 The court stated, “[a]mendments may be of different 
types and may serve different functions. Depending on the nature and 
purpose of an amendment, it may have a limiting effect within a 
spectrum ranging from great to small to zero.”67 
The court enumerated several reasons for such an approach. Among 
these reasons was the unpredictable nature of what equivalents may later 
be used to practice the invention.68 In applying a flexible bar, the court 
refused to close equivalents: “we . . . reject that view [that would 
preclude equivalents in cases where prosecution history may apply] as a 
wooden application of estoppel, negating entirely the doctrine of 
equivalents and limiting determination of infringement issues to 
consideration of literal infringement.”69 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit 
would often apply a flexible bar to equivalents when deciding cases 
involving prosecution history estoppel and would make a determination 
of equivalents based on the nature and purpose of the amendment at 
issue. 
However, this approach was not the only one followed by panels of 
the Federal Circuit. The Kinzenbaw70 line of cases adopted an approach 
that was in opposition to that of Hughes I. Federal Circuit panels that 
chose to follow the Kinzenbaw court refused to look into the reasons for 
amendments and refused a patentee the opportunity to recapture any of 
the surrendered subject matter by equivalents.71 The Supreme Court’s 
first attempt to resolve the issue came a few years later in its decision in 
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.72 
 
 63. Id. at 1362. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1363. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. at 1362. 
 69. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 70. Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 71. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 573 (Fed. Cir. 
2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 915 (2001), vacated by 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (Festo III) (citing 5A 
CHISUM, supra note 36 at § 18.05 (3)(b)). 
 72. 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
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The relevant facts of Warner-Jenkinson are relatively simple. A 
patentee held a patent on a process for filtering dyes between a pH of 6.0 
and a pH of 9.0.73 The upper limit of 9.0 was added during prosecution to 
avoid a prior art reference that operated at a pH above 9.0, but there were 
no reasons given for the amended lower limit.74 The accused infringer 
performed a filtering process at a pH of 5.0.75 At trial, the patentee 
conceded there was no literal infringement, and relied instead solely on 
the doctrine of equivalents.76 The defendant argued that the doctrine of 
equivalents was no longer valid in view of the Patent Act of 1952, and 
even if the doctrine of equivalents were still valid, it would not apply 
because of prosecution history estoppel.77 The Supreme Court refused to 
adopt this view and instead took the opportunity to set forth a new 
analysis for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents: The Court 
held that the doctrine of equivalents was still in effect but that it needed 
to be refined in order to limit conflicts with the definitional and public 
notice function of claims.78 To this end, the Court held that when 
analyzing an accused infringing device or process against a claimed 
invention, each element must be compared, not simply the invention as a 
whole: “Each element contained in a patent claimed is deemed material 
to defining the scope of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine of 
equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the claim, not to 
the invention as a whole.”79 Thus, the Supreme Court took an affirmative 
step toward narrowing the range of equivalents while increasing the 
predictability with which equivalents might be applied and while also 
consolidating the two lines of cases. Under the Warner-Jenkinson 
standard, each claim element must be present, either literally or by 
equivalents. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. was 
among the cases remanded by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in 
light of Warner-Jenkinson .80 
V. FESTO 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Festo I was not extraordinary. A 
simplified version of the issue was whether an alloy sleeve that 
 
 73. Id. at 22. 
 74. Id. at 22-23. 
 75. Id. at 23. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 1047-48. 
 78. See id. at 1048-49. 
 79. Id. at 1049. 
 80. 72 F.3d 857 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Festo I), vacated by 520 U.S. 1111 (1997); cert. granted 
533 U.S. 915 (2001), vacated by 533 U.S. 722 (2002). 
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prevented magnetic leakage was equivalent to a magnetizable sleeve that 
prevented magnetic leakage and whether single two-way seals are 
equivalent to two one-way seals.81 The description of the sleeve as being 
made of a magnetizable material was added during prosecution, but the 
reasons for the amendment were unclear.82 Accordingly, the court upheld 
the jury’s finding of infringement because there was equivalence under 
the function-way-result test.83 The case was remanded for 
reconsideration in view of Warner-Jenkinson.84 
The Federal Circuit’s decision on remand, Festo II,85 as compared to 
Festo I, was extraordinary. In a sweeping move, the Federal Circuit 
attempted to eliminate all equivalents with respect to any element that 
has been amended for a substantial reason relating to patentability.86 The 
Federal Circuit’s opinion focused on its answers to five en banc 
questions directed to what types of amendments create an estoppel and 
the scope of that estoppel.87 
The first question is, 
For the purposes of determining whether an amendment to a claim 
creates prosecution history estoppel, is a “substantial reason related to 
patentability” (citations omitted) limited to those amendments made to 
overcome prior art under § 102 and § 103, or does “patentability mean 
any reason affecting the issuance of a patent?”88 
As discussed above, 35 U.S.C. § 102 and § 103 are the sections 
dealing with novelty and non-obviousness. These two sections deal with 
patentability as it relates to prior art or to what was previously known. 
Consequently, amendments based on these considerations are typically 
the subject matter of prosecution history estoppel, since the amendments 
are typically made to distinguish the subject matter of the application 
over the prior art. With respect to first question, the court held, 
[A] substantial reason related to patentability” is not limited to 
overcoming prior art, but includes other reasons related to the statutory 
requirements for a patent. Therefore, an amendment that narrows the 
scope of a claim for any reason related to the statutory requirements for 
 
 81. Id. at 861-862. 
 82. Id. at 864. 
 83. See id. at 868. See also id. at 862. 
 84. 520 U.S. 1111 (1997). 
 85. 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 86. See id. at 562. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id at 563. 
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a patent will give rise to prosecution history estoppel with respect to the 
amended claim.89 
Accordingly, any amendment that fulfills a statutory requirement and 
narrows a claim will give rise to prosecution history estoppel. The court 
attempted to reconcile its position with the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Warner-Jenkinson by implying that not all amendments are made to 
comply with statutory requirements and hence not motivated by 
patentability concerns.90 While it may be true that not all amendments 
are related to statutory provision, the court took the estoppel further with 
their answer to the second question. 
The second question was similar to the first, “should a ‘voluntary’ 
claim amendment—one not required by the examiner or made in 
response to a rejection by an examiner for a stated reason—create 
prosecution history estoppel?”91 The court’s answer to this question 
made clear that it had no interest in differentiating between voluntary and 
involuntary amendments: “[v]oluntary claim amendments are treated the 
same as other amendments. Therefore, a voluntary amendment that 
narrows the scope of a claim for a reason related to the statutory 
requirements for a patent will give rise to prosecution history estoppel as 
to the amended claim element.”92 
Thus, the application of prosecution history estoppel to an 
amendment made to satisfy any statutory requirement effectively makes 
any amendment the subject of prosecution history estoppel. To extend 
prosecution history estoppel to any amendment can easily be justified by 
retreating to the public notice function of claims and prosecution 
history.93 The public is entitled to rely upon the public record as notice of 
what they can and cannot do. If the circuit court’s decision had been 
upheld, patent drafters would have been on notice that any amendment 
made to satisfy statutory requirements would result in an estoppel and 
could have reacted accordingly. These answers were not ground shaking. 
The court’s answer to the next question, however, was. 
In the fourth question the court asked, “[i]f a claim amendment 
creates prosecution history estoppel, under Warner-Jenkinson what range 
of equivalents, if any, is available under the doctrine of equivalents for 
the claim element so amended?”94 The court answered, “[w]hen a claim 
amendment creates prosecution history estoppel with regard to a claim 
 
 89. Id. at 563. 
 90. Id. at 567-68. 
 91. Id. at 568. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 569. 
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element, there is no range of equivalents available for the amended claim 
element. Application of the doctrine of equivalents to the claim element 
is completely barred (a ‘complete bar’).”95 
The practical effects of this pronouncement were considerable. The 
Federal Circuit itself had earlier recognized that very few claims are 
allowed without amendment.96 As a practical matter, this new “complete 
bar” pronouncement would have eviscerated the doctrine of equivalents. 
In most circumstances, the very point of novelty would be strictly held to 
the literal language of the claims. The Supreme Court in Graver Tank 
had recognized the difficulties in such an approach: “[o]utright and 
forthright duplication is a dull and very rare type of infringement. To 
prohibit no other would place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism and 
would be subordinating substance to form.”97 Despite the history of the 
doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit chose to ignore precedent and 
adopt a new standard because, as the Federal Circuit announced, the 
doctrine had become “unworkable.”98 
The court then proceeded to list the benefits of the complete bar. The 
court emphasized that under the complete bar the patentee and public 
would have greater notice of what is actually covered by the patent. 99 
The court argued that such a public notice would encourage subsequent 
advancement: “[U]nder the complete bar approach, technological 
advances that would have lain in the unknown, undefined zone around 
the literal terms of a narrowed claim under the flexible bar approach will 
not go wasted and undeveloped due to fear of litigation.”100 Such 
development may actually be fostered by such a bar, but the court failed 
to consider the chilling effect that such a standard would have on those 
considering initial development. Is the undeveloped zone that is found in 
equivalents such that developments within such a zone would outweigh 
any possible chilling effects initial developments? 
The court, however, did not address the issue. Instead, the court’s 
answer to the fourth question established a presumption that when no 
reason for an amendment is given, there would be no range of 
equivalents.101 Thus, the court cut off equivalents for all amendments, 
not simply those that were related to patentability. In light of the answers 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Hughes Aircraft v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 97. Graver Tank v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). 
 98. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 575 (Fed.Cir. 
2000). 
 99. Id. at 576-578. 
 100. Id. at 577. 
 101. Id. at 578. 
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to the first four questions, the court chose not to address the fifth 
question, which it considered to be moot.102 
After addressing these four questions, the court proceeded to analyze 
the facts before it. Given that the patentee had amended the claims 
during prosecution and that infringement had only been found under the 
doctrine of equivalents, the court reversed the jury’s finding of 
infringement.103 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court’s decision, Festo 
III,104 was much anticipated. Would the Supreme Court uphold the 
Federal Court’s decision?  It seemed unlikely given the long history of 
the doctrine of equivalents. Would the Supreme Court over-turn all of the 
findings, or merely some of them?  What would stand?  What would 
become of equivalents? 
The Supreme Court’s short opinion reintroduced a flexible bar while 
substantially stiffening that bar. In arriving at its holding, the Court 
adopted the Federal Circuit’s holding that if a patentee makes a 
narrowing amendment, either to satisfy the requirements of patent law or 
without reason; such an amendment creates an estoppel.105 But despite 
agreeing with the Federal Circuit with respect to the types of 
amendments that create estoppel, the Court disagreed with the Federal 
Circuit as to the effects of that estoppel. The Court stated 
The amendment does not show that the inventor suddenly had more 
foresight in the drafting of claims than an inventor whose application 
was granted without amendments being submitted. It shows only that 
he was familiar with the broader text and with the difference between 
the two. As a result, there is no more reason for holding the patentee to 
the literal terms of an amended claim than there is for abolishing the 
doctrine of equivalents altogether and holding every patentee to the 
literal terms of the patent.106 
If a claim amendment creates estoppel, but that estoppel is not a 
complete bar, what then is the proper range of equivalents?  With respect 
to this question, the Supreme Court held that “the patentee should bear 
the burden of showing that the amendment does not surrender the 
particular equivalent in question.”107 This established that when a patent 
 
 102. Id. The fifth question asked, “Would a judgment of infringement in this case violate 
Warner Jenkinson’s requirement that the application of the doctrine of equivalents ‘is not allowed 
such broad play as to eliminate an element in its entirety?”  Id. Clearly, where there were no 
equivalents there could be no expansion of those equivalents. 
 103. Id. at 591. 
 104. 122 S.Ct. 1831 (2002). 
 105. Id. at 1839-42. 
 106. Id. at 1841. 
 107. Id. 
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claim has been amended the patentee has surrendered all of the subject 
matter asserted between the original claim and the narrower amended 
claim. In making an amendment, a patentee knows that he will bear the 
burden of proving that he did not surrender equivalents of the narrower 
claim. 
This rule naturally gave rise to the question of how a patentee proves 
that he did not surrender the equivalent. The court outlined several 
conditions under which a patentee could not be deemed to have 
surrendered the equivalents: One such condition occurs when the 
equivalent in question was unforeseeable at the time of the application.108 
Another condition occurs when “the rationale underlying the amendment 
may bear no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in 
question.”109 The third provision serves as a safety net: “[t]here may be 
some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonable be 
expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in question.”110 
In theory, the first condition would add predictability to the 
litigation. Those who were thinking of developing something that might 
fall in the range of equivalents would be able to look at the equivalents 
available at the time of the patent application. But this theory fails when 
looking at what it actually affords those who go to court  Litigants 
defending a patent infringement suit are likely to look at the language 
requiring that in order to be entitled to equivalents, a patentee must prove 
that the equivalent was not foreseeable at the time of the application.111 
The question of what equivalents were available would then turn on 
whether the equivalent was foreseeable. The difficulty involved in the 
practice of looking to the past to determine what was foreseeable almost 
always ends in a battle of experts. Such a standard, though in theory 
more predictable, would add little surety to those wishing to avoid 
expensive litigation. 
Similarly, the second condition under which the Court says 
equivalents might be available does nothing more than reintroduce the 
difficulties of looking at the reason for an amendment. If the second 
condition provides little in the way of predictability, the third condition 
provides even less. Instead it gives litigants a basis for arguing any 
variety of theories based on “other reasons.” 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Over the years, the doctrine of equivalents has become more and 
more restricted in its application. This restriction has been gradual, 
beginning with the addition of the function-way-result test. To that test 
was added the flexible bar and the all elements test. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Festo added a further limitation on the doctrine of 
equivalents by effectively adding a limitation to prosecution history 
estoppel that the equivalent not be foreseeable. This new element, while 
arguably forcing or requiring the claims to provide more of a notice 
function may come at too great a price. By holding a patentee to the strict 
language of his patent, the Supreme Court effectively eliminated the 
doctrine of equivalents. This is true for several reasons. 
For example, a patentee loses equivalents for any claim element that 
has been amended. The argument in support of this approach advocates 
that patent drafters need to be more careful when drafting claims. Such 
precision, if possible, would require an exponential increase in the cost 
of obtaining patent protection.  Additionally, this new element will add 
more expense to litigation by requiring expert testimony not only as to 
the state of the art and the scope of the claims, but as to what would have 
been foreseeable at the time of application. Such standards, rather than 
fostering invention, simply make it increasingly difficult for parties to 
obtain and enforce their patents resulting in an overall chilling effect on 
the marketplace. This could not have been what the framer’s considered 
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